

Salvador Dalí in Rem Koolhaas' *Delirious New York*

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The penultimate chapter of Rem Koolhaas' *Delirious New York* (1978) begins with: 'In the mid-thirties both Salvador Dalí and Le Corbusier — they hate each other — visit New York for the first time'. Koolhaas inventively rewrites Dalí's 'paranoid critical method', then announces in the part 'Combat' that Le Corbusier is diagnosed paranoid, followed in 'Otherwordliness', by the claim that architecture is *inevitably* the result of paranoid critical activity, and concrete is described as the method's purest embodiment. Anyone familiar with Dalí's writings would recognise Koolhaas' choice of Le Corbusier as an opponent. In the 1920s, Dalí wrote admiringly of Le Corbusier, but in the 1950s Dalí wrote about Le Corbusier so critically that by the 60s it turned comically vicious. Dalí advocated light, soft, and curved buildings, and found Le Corbusier's concrete architecture horribly heavy, materially and metaphorically. When Koolhaas introduces the antagonism between Dalí and Le Corbusier in *Delirious New York*, no mention is made of Dalí's remarks about concrete. Instead, concrete is Koolhaas' choice as the exemplar of the paranoid critical method. Dalí wrote about his surrealist creative process — the paranoiac-critical method — in the 1930s, amid two theories of paranoia: constructionalist and anti-constructionalist. Dalí, along with Jacques Lacan, was resolutely anti-constructionalist. Neither of these terms has any currency in contemporary theories of paranoia, but Surrealism valued the mythos of the mad artist and these two theories of paranoia had artistic practices associated with them. By avoiding Dalí's disdain for Le Corbusier's concrete architecture, Koolhaas' theory for an architectural surrealism of paranoid critical activity extends Dalí's anti-constructionalist method into a distinctly new architectural surrealism.

Introduction

By the mid-1970s, when Rem Koolhaas was preparing *Delirious New York*, the once lustrous surrealist movement was fading. Most of the original Parisian surrealist group had died. Salvador Dalí, younger than most of the surrealists, was an ageing celebrity amusing himself by dictating rather gossipy books and confusing earnest interviewers, but most of his creative energy was spent on the completion of his museum in Catalonia. In 1978, an important revival in anglophone Surrealism scholarship occurred: London's Hayward Gallery opened a retrospective 'Dada and Surrealism Reviewed', *Architectural Design (AD)* published a special issue 'Surrealism and Architecture', and Koolhaas' *Delirious*

New York was published.¹ Near the end of *Delirious New York* is a long chapter where Dalí is contrasted with Le Corbusier, during which Koolhaas writes that architecture is ‘inevitably’ the result of paranoid critical activity.² Dalí’s paranoiac-critical method and Koolhaas’ paranoiac critical method (*paranoiac* is substituted with *paranoid* in Koolhaas’ revision) are related but subtly different theories. With this adapted method, Koolhaas announced the possibility of a truly surreal architecture, though perhaps at the cost of Surrealism’s dissolution into all architecture.

Dalí developed the paranoiac-critical method during his time with the original Parisian surrealist group, more than four decades before *Delirious New York* and almost no analytical texts had then been written on the subject.³ Dalí developed his theory of the paranoiac-critical method in the context of changing ideas about paranoia. Aligned with the young Jacques Lacan, Dalí promoted anti-constitutionalist and anti-constructionalist paranoia against constitutionalist and constructionalist paranoia. His paranoiac-critical method was built upon precisely the anti-constructionalist interpretation.

What we find in *Delirious New York* is Koolhaas’ hybrid constructionalist and anti-constructionalist paranoiac critical method. By binding Dalí’s anti-constructionalist method with the constructionalist one, I argue that Koolhaas bends the meaning of Dalí’s paranoiac-critical method to validate Le Corbusier’s concrete architecture — an architecture that Dalí unambiguously detested. This allows Koolhaas to open the possibility of an architectural surrealism unburdened by Surrealism’s early attachment to automatism, but by doing this he dissolves any clear distinction between surreal architecture and regular architecture.

Few secondary authors have attempted to explain what Koolhaas did with Dalí’s theories in *Delirious New York*, and none have analysed the validity of his claims. A review of the citations found in the secondary literature reveals that only three conference papers use references beyond those found in *AD*’s ‘Surrealism and Architecture’ and *Delirious New York*.⁴ A broader reading of the background material reveals that Koolhaas was far more knowledgeable on Dalí’s ideas than his references indicated, and that he was as loose and subversive in his interpretation of Dalí’s ideas as he was with *Delirious New York*’s other motifs. Where other authors merely repeated the two author’s formulas and referenced them back to Surrealism’s broader agenda, this essay dives into the nuance of Dalí’s theories and his tense history with Le Corbusier, revealing what Koolhaas knowingly left out of *Delirious New York*.

Before appraising the key art and architectural works associated with these specific theories of paranoia, let us begin with the terms — constitutionalist and anti-constructionalist. It is doubtful that Koolhaas knew of the constructionism versus anti-constructionism debate in psychology. No known secondary authors on either Surrealism or architecture have examined this debate. Koolhaas is known to celebrate Russian Constructivism — ‘The Story of the Pool’ that concludes *Delirious New York* is one example — but neither is this, as far as I am aware, related to the debate.⁵ Today, neither terms,

constructionalist nor constitutionalist, are used in contemporary accounts of paranoia. In fact, the meaning of the word 'paranoia' has changed so much that, when reflecting on the course of the twentieth century, Kenneth S. Kendler recently wrote in *Schizophrenia Bulletin*, the 'criteria for paranoia/delusional disorder do not well reflect the symptoms and signs frequently reported by historical experts'.⁶

The leading theorist of paranoia in the surrealist's time, and across much of the twentieth century, was German psychologist Emil Kraepelin. When Kraepelin began his work on paranoia, the term was used for an extraordinarily broad range of illnesses; indeed, half of admissions in German mental hospitals at the end of the nineteenth century were for paranoia.⁷ In 1899, Kraepelin introduced the diagnostic category of 'dementia praecox', which was relabelled in 1908 by Eugen Beuler as 'schizophrenia', covering many cases previously labelled as paranoia.⁸ Kraepelin narrowed the criteria of paranoia to a 'gradual development of a stable progressive system of delusions, without marked mental deterioration, clouding of consciousness, or disorder of thought, will, or conduct'.⁹ These symptoms of paranoid delusions, like the symptoms of schizophrenia, were thought to originate from some form of physical degeneracy. This was the constitutionalist approach to paranoia: a weakened physical constitution manifesting 'feeble-mindedness'.¹⁰

This constitutionalist interpretation was questioned directly in the introduction of Lacan's doctoral thesis. He asked: is paranoia 'a constitutional anomaly or a reactive deformation?'¹¹ From the perspective of an anti-constitutionalist, Lacan defined paranoia 'as "a mode of reaction" rather than as a developmental anomaly or an organic process'.¹² Anti-constitutionalist paranoia emerges in response to an environment. More tellingly, Lacan's interest was not in the symptoms of paranoia, but that it affected 'elementary phenomena' and 'personal meaning'.¹³ Since paranoia affects elementary phenomena and their cathexis, it is part of one's personality; there is a paranoid structure to the ego, and logical analysis itself is a form of 'guided paranoia'.¹⁴ Paranoia is thereby understood not necessarily as a pathology, but a fundamental aspect of consciousness, an 'associative engine' constructing the appearance of reality.¹⁵ For Dalí this would lead to ontological speculations about reality and the simulacra generated through paranoid delirium, but the topic of the ontology and ontography of Surrealism is adjacent to the present essay, and aside from some remarks later, we will stay focused on how the two theories of paranoia lead to two kinds of paranoid-critical methods in arts and architectures.

In summary, the distinction between the constitutionalist and anti-constitutionalist interpretations only corresponds to whether or not there is an organic physical cause; and the distinction between the constructionalist and anti-constructionalist positions corresponds to the pervasiveness of the paranoia throughout the psyche, whether or not it is unconscious. This second definition will be expanded recursively as the essay progresses. While the constitutionalists understood paranoia as arising organically from the body, they saw paranoid ideations as being constructed more or less consciously. Like the

paranoid with persecution mania misreading indifferent signs as threateningly foreboding, their conclusions are nonetheless assembled logically from the available evidence. The anti-constitutionalist saw paranoia arising as a reaction to an environment, and paranoid ideations are constructed unconsciously and consciously.

Although here I am writing about psychopathological constructs, we can grasp an aspect of Dalí's surrealist art by rereading the previous sentence substituting paranoia with 'paranoid art'. The whereabouts of paranoid ideation within the psyche was thereby an important distinction for its validity as a surrealist method: what is the difference between allowing unconscious images to emerge, and fabricating the appearance of the unconscious? Although verging towards misleading over-simplification, the difference between conscious and unconscious paranoid association can be understood with a pair of examples. Imagine seeing a footprint, and then, after considering this evidence, arriving at the conclusion that someone is following you. Now instead imagine a situation where the qualities and the object fused together unconsciously, so they appear together at the moment of perception, like seeing a red bird. You do not first see a bird, and then reason that it is red. This binding of qualities to objects, to an anti-constitutionalist, is done unconsciously.

These two interpretations of paranoia took two artistic forms in Dalí's work, exemplified in the next parts 'Freud's vulture' and 'Gestalt's assemblages', which together are assembled into the paranoid-critical method. Finally, we will return to Koolhaas' tales of Dalí and Le Corbusier in *Delirious New York* and his presentation of architecture as inevitably a product of a paranoid critical method.

Freud's vulture

Freud left a brilliantly flawed record of art interpretation. His book-length essay, *Leonardo da Vinci: A Psychosexual Study of an Infantile Reminiscence* (1910), interprets Leonardo's art within a psychoanalytic context. However, deep flaws in the research underpinning the interpretation, aligned with some coincidence, turned the interpretation from a story about an artist's childhood unconsciously affecting his later work to an example of a phenomenon that Dalí understood as an anti-constitutionalist paranoid delirium. Freud's analysis of Leonardo was grounded in a single anecdote. In the volumes of texts left by Leonardo, there is one childhood reminiscence. As Freud retold it, a vulture landed on the side of the infant Leonardo's cradle and pushed its tail into his mouth.¹⁶ Here Freud applied his nascent theory of sexuality developed with Isidor Sadger, who was also influential, but later discredited.¹⁷ Freud interpreted Leonardo's childhood memory as a phantasy symbolically depicting two desires. Noting that the Italian word for tail is slang for penis, Freud saw passive homosexuality in Leonardo's phantasy. Then noting that the ancient Egyptian symbol of the vulture represented the mother, Freud saw a refiguring of breastfeeding and a desire for the mother.

A few years after the publication of Freud's essay, Swiss psychoanalyst Oskar Pfister saw an image of a vulture in the blue drapery in Leonardo's painting, *The Virgin and Child with Saint Anne* (c. 1501–1519).¹⁸ This sighting both confirmed the validity of Freud's interpretation, and announced the discovery of double images in Leonardo's pictorial work. Freud included Pfister's discovery in his essay's second edition. A decade later, as Surrealism was beginning to gather momentum, soon-to-be Director of London's Victoria and Albert Museum, Sir Eric Maclagan, published a reply to Freud's conclusions.¹⁹ Leonardo's handwritten 'nibbio' had been translated into Freud's German edition as 'vulture', but it should have been 'kite', a raptor like a small hawk, nothing like a vulture, and certainly not the symbolic bird of Egyptian mythology.

Freud constructed the associations that Pfister perceived; the persuasive power of Freud's idea generated the conditions in which the discovery could be made. Even though Maclagan's research dismantled most of Freud's interpretation, the vulture is still visible in the painting today. The object of the vulture has an extraordinary status, demonstrating the creative power of interpretation, and proving that by aligning some coincidences, interpreters can materially manifest what they anticipate perceiving. The artistic phenomenon of the vulture was of great importance to Dalí, and he referred to it years later when defining his paranoiac-critical method in the context of Dalí's revision of Gestalt theories of surrealist art. Here we see Pfister's unconscious loaded up by his conscious, primed to perceive a certain way, and the unconscious paranoiac mechanism finding a match for its pattern.

Gestalt's constructions

Dalí joined Breton's Paris surrealist group in 1929 almost a decade after it began. In 1928 Dalí was two years out of art school and experimenting with surrealist practices through the lens of Hans Prinzhorn's Gestalt theories of art from *Artistry of the Mentally Ill: A Contribution to the Psychology and Psychopathology of Configuration* (1922), where 'configuration' is a translation of the German 'Gestaltung'. Dalí here was accepting the lead of the surrealists who had taken an immediate interest in Prinzhorn's book.²⁰

Prinzhorn's Gestalt psychology described the mind as possessing unconscious organising mechanisms, and examined two specific cognitive processes: the recognition of groups and the recognition of whole objects from fragments. Gestalt theory described five principles: similarity, continuation, closure, proximity, and figure-ground relationships, which strongly influenced the recognition of objects. These principles operate in the service of six unconscious desires: the urge to play, to interpret, to ornament, to order, to imitate, and the urge for symbolic significance. As one manifestation of the urge to play, Prinzhorn described doodling as an automatic process combined with active interpretation:

There is a psychological urge whereby 'every shape, no matter now undefined and unobjective, demands interpretation' [...] Only the individual stroke springs

from a blind impulse, while the integration of the separate parts is guided by their author, no matter how inattentive he may be.²¹

Dalí's early surrealist paintings such as *Honey is Sweeter than Blood* (1927) and *Little Ashes* (1928) used Prinzhorn's unconscious process of doodling in painting with the accumulation of isolated brushstrokes.²² These paintings were constructed in two distinct stages.²³ First, a brusquely painted landscape consisting mostly of sky is completed. Next, onto this landscape, many fine brush marks are added, bearing the appearance of improvisation. In various places the brush marks these resemble hairs, thin clouds, or clumps of dirt. Where they are painted in small 'v' shapes they resemble caricatured insects and birds. Where they are grouped together they resemble tree branches, veins, or other organic forms. As groups of strokes accumulate in small areas, the unconscious, demanding interpretation, organises them into known patterns and they appear as apparitions of faces, hands, rotting birds, donkeys, plants, breasts, and genitals.²⁴ With this Gestalt approach, Dalí was able to build up pictorial representation while foregrounding visual signs of the automatism already accepted by the surrealist group. To attain his mature surrealist modality, Dalí had to re-examine his technique in light of contemporary theories of paranoia.

Constructionalist and anti-constructionalist paranoia

Today's popular understanding of paranoia is not dissimilar from the one held in the 1920s. Based on early observations, Jacques Lacan wrote, paranoia's symptoms 'clinically manifest themselves through persecution mania'.²⁵ Yet actual persecution is only one of many possible manifestations of the paranoid associations. Like the Gestalt processes, paranoia is an ordering mechanism that associates cognitive phenomenon. When describing paranoia, Dalí repeatedly referred to a kind of 'delirium of interpretative association involving a systematic structure'.²⁶ A paranoid person is overwhelmed by assemblages of associations. What persecution mania and the other forms of paranoia have in common is that the paranoid sees signs of their obsessive belief in reality. Dalí further describes:

Paranoia uses the external world in order to assert its dominating idea, and has the disturbing characteristic of making others accept this idea's reality. The reality of the external world is used for illustration and proof, and so comes to serve the reality of the mind.²⁷

Everyone uses the external world, more or less, to justify their ideas, but when paranoia is considered unhealthy, it is a misdirected and exaggerated aspect of a normal psychological function. To easily imagine one's ordinary paranoid capacity in constructionalist and anti-constructionalist manners, consider again the contrasting examples. The Gestalt process of doodling playfully describes an improvised beginning that is increasingly regulated by the demands of formal and symbolic association. This is constructionalist paranoia which describes the assembly of ideas around an obsession. From this perspective, we might say that a paranoid person slowly builds up an idea or

progressively talks themselves into the validity of their ideas. On the other side of the argument is Dalí, adamantly anti-constructionalist and admiring of Lacan's work precisely because he too was anti-constructionalist.²⁸ The key example of an anti-constructionalist paranoiac object is Freud's vulture, wherein all the accumulated associations are unconscious or preconscious. The vulture Pfister found in Leonardo's image acted as paranoiac proof of Freud's vulture theory. The whole vulture appeared to Pfisker in an instant with the full system of associations and the full object, already complete.²⁹ It was not progressively assembled, but 'encountered' in its fully formed state.³⁰ The following quote shows how the vulture was essential for Dalí's theorisation, notwithstanding that Dalí misremembered which of Leonardo's paintings had been mentioned, and conflated Freud's analysis with Pfister's discovery of the vulture in *The Virgin and Child with Saint Anne*:

Freud, in analysing the famous invisible vulture (which appears in that strangest of pictures, Leonardo's *Virgin of the Rocks*) involuntarily laid the epistemological and philosophical cornerstone of that majestic edifice of immanent 'paranoiac painting'.³¹

This anti-constructionalist paranoiac object was then the declared pictorial aim of Dalí's work in what he called 'the concrete irrational subject':

[I]n order that the world of the imagination and of concrete irrationality may be as objectively evident, of the same consistency, of the same durability, of the same persuasive, cognoscitive and communicable thickness as that of the exterior world of phenomenal reality.³²

When Breton defined Surrealism, unlike most other art movements or styles, he defined it by its method of '[p]ure psychic automatism, by which it is intended to express [...] the real process of thought'.³³ Since Surrealism was established in the context of automatic methods, it allowed sufficient freedom for the spoken word transcribed into poetry, semi-blind drawing like the *Exquisite Corpse*, found-objects, and collage. However, the complex process of crafting resemblance in oil painting, especially when the physical endurance of the finished painting is of concern, requires a large degree of reasoned premeditation and conscious control. Complex crafts like academic oil painting, and by extension we can include architecture, could not be automatized. Resemblance in oil painting seemed beyond the reach of Breton's early conceptions of the surrealist method. Christian Zervos recognised this problem in 1928, the year Dalí first seriously explored surrealist painting, in his article on Surrealism in *Cahiers d'Art*, when he identified that without conscious craftsmanship, resemblance altogether would be lost:

[T]here will be insurmountable obstacles to the physical execution of the pictorial work [...] But where I could admit to rigour for a poetic essay, it would be impossible in the design of a painted work.³⁴

Dalí's paranoia critical method proposed to pass this methodological barrier by asserting the primacy of Freud's vulture. Instead of the Gestalt model which relied on conspicuously improvised brushstrokes to indicate automatic painterly mark making, Dalí argued that artist's role was simply to see objects like the vulture, ideally be the first person to see it, then craft a representation to share with others. The surrealist activity occurs at the moment of perception,

not at the level of production. Hence the definition Dalí gave of his paranoiac-critical method — ‘the spontaneous method of irrational knowledge based on the critical and systematic objectifications of delirious associations and interpretations’³⁵ — focussed on spontaneous knowledge, not spontaneous fabrication.³⁶

The ‘spontaneity’ that gives rise to Freud’s vulture entrains a question as to whether or not all images are constructed in this unconscious manner. As Dalí developed his theory of the paranoiac-critical method from 1930 to 1935, he gently changed his view. In 1930, he questioned the issue and stated that ‘doubts are raised in our minds regarding the question of whether the images of reality itself are not merely products of our own paranoiac capacity’.³⁷ This anticipated the consequences of asserting that all perception was paranoiac (with the sentence Koolhaas and Mau used as the definition of ‘systematise’ in *S, M, L, XL*): ‘I believe that the moment is at hand when by a paranoid and active advance of the mind it will be possible to systematize confusion and thus help to discredit completely the world of reality’.³⁸ Finally in 1935, Dalí committed to the principle, writing that: “‘paranoiac phenomenon” (delirium of systematic interpretation) is consubstantial with the human phenomenon of sight’.³⁹ Here Dalí is using sight as a central specific example of Lacan’s earlier assertion that paranoia influences ‘elementary phenomena’ including ‘personal meaning’.⁴⁰ With this move, Dalí brought together found and laboriously fabricated objects into the domain of surrealist objects.⁴¹ This is the point where Koolhaas separates his theory from Dalí’s. Koolhaas describes the method as ‘tourism’, making the method ‘a tourism of sanity into the realm of paranoia’,⁴² reiterating Breton’s later claim that Dalí was both actor and spectator of paranoia.⁴³ While for Koolhaas and Breton paranoia could be simulated, and the paranoiac experience could be arranged like a tourist holiday, for Dalí it was an inescapable phenomenon.

Paranoiac ontographies

Following the anti-constructuralist logic, paranoiac ideation leads to questions of ontology, including Lacan’s idiosyncratic work on ontology, and the ontography of art.⁴⁴ As Dalí wrote, Freud’s vulture was the ‘epistemological and philosophical cornerstone’ of paranoiac painting, notably not ‘the psychological cornerstone’ because the realisation of our perpetual immersion into paranoiac delirium shifts the discourse around paranoia from psychological theory and creative methodology to ontology, that is, into fundamental statements about reality. Andre Breton and George Bataille, the two surrealists who were most explicit about their ontological beliefs, adhered to the ontological tradition of idealism best understood as Kantian anti-realism.⁴⁵ Dalí, at the beginning of his surrealist work also appeared to promote an anti-realist ontology, and we can see this clearly expressed in the aim that Koolhaas quoted, ‘to discredit completely the world of reality’.⁴⁶ Dalí’s ontological position however was not anti-realist but infra-realist; paranoiac delirium is thereby a veiling layer

over a deeper, withdrawn reality.⁴⁷ Hence Dalí separates reality into two distinct domains: the reality of the external world, and the reality of the mind.⁴⁸ Koolhaas' ontological position is not completely clear. He appears to hold an anti-realist ontology when he writes that 'the world can be reshuffled like a pack of cards whose original sequence is a disappointment'.⁴⁹ Yet he later described the urban architectural project *City of the Captive Globe* (1972) as a project to 'invent, destroy and restore the world of phenomenal reality'.⁵⁰ Whether or not Koolhaas intends phenomenal reality to be understood as reality as a whole is unclear, but unlikely, hence the guess of infra-realism.

Dalí's ontological pairing of the reality of the external world with the reality of the mind loosely corresponded to Freud's pairing of the pleasure principle with the reality principle, and thereby included a therapeutic aspect, and an ambition to work towards aligning the reality of the mind with the reality of the world by refining the contents of the super-ego.⁵¹ Many of Dalí's surrealist objects from the 1930s he referred to as masochistic phantoms corresponding to the formative period of his super-ego.⁵² Eventually, as he became cured of his phobias, these masochistic phantoms 'disappear[ed] almost completely'.⁵³ Dalí's later work, from the 1940s onwards, was then less concerned with the curative aspect and even less with the discrediting of reality: 'Enough of trying to cure; one must sublimate! Enough of disintegration; one must integrate, integrate, integrate!'⁵⁴ It was not the early surrealist Dalí, who was obsessed with masochistic phantoms during the slow formation of his super-ego, that objected to Le Corbusier's concrete architecture, but the later Dalí who was concerned with an active synthesis of the reality of the mind with the reality of the world.

Le Corbusier and Dalí

Le Corbusier was aware of Surrealism from the movement's infancy. In 1924 and 1925, André Breton's *La Révolution surréaliste* [*Surrealist Revolution*] and Le Corbusier's *L'Esprit nouveau* were rival journals arguing different moralities and different aesthetics.⁵⁵ Dalí, Breton, and Le Corbusier all attended the premiere of Man Ray's *La Mystères du château de Dé*, and Dalí and Luis Buñuel's *Un Chien Andalou*, on 6 June 1929.⁵⁶ If Le Corbusier had any affiliative affection for Surrealism, he later seems to have collectively regarded them with sympathetic disdain. When Le Corbusier wrote about surrealist art for their flagship publication, *Minoature*, he described the art of his mentally ill cousin, Louis Sutter, who was institutionalised against his will.⁵⁷ More acute however are Le Corbusier's remarks comparing Surrealism to Cubism, and by extension his own Purism, a year later:

Cubism is the discernment of new times. Health, strength, optimism, creation [...]

Surrealism is a noble, elegant, artistic funereal institution [characterised by] sensitive souls, lacking in solidity.⁵⁸

For Le Corbusier, surrealists like their aristocratic clients were romantics pathologically disconnected from reality and nostalgically obsessed with a passing age.

Overwrought with exhaustion and anguish, they were ghosts, or soon to be, as the smoky remains of a burnt out fire.

The evening of the film premiere marked the perigee of their orbits, and thereafter Dalí maintained a hostile silence. Between 1927 and 1928, Dalí wrote several essays admiring Le Corbusier including the aforementioned *Yellow Manifesto*.⁵⁹ But when Dalí discovered Surrealism he wrote that the 'new limits' of painting lay in 'the opposite pole' from Purism and, thereafter, remained silent for thirty years. After a brief skirmish in the mid-1950s over Antoni Gaudí, Dalí returned to the subject of Le Corbusier in full force in 1967, immediately after the seventy-seven-year-old Le Corbusier drowned while swimming in the waters in front of his Mediterranean home.⁶⁰ Perhaps especially since Le Corbusier had remarked, '[h]ow nice it would be to die swimming towards the sun', Le Corbusier's drowning produced in Dalí something of a nervous, agitated excitement.⁶¹ Almost immediately afterwards he accepted a commission to write an *Open Letter* for an esteemed Parisian publisher, Albin Michel, which Dalí turned into a meditation on his contempt for Le Corbusier, initiating a sadistic line of criticism that Dalí would repeat for years.

Dalí's sharpest invectives against Le Corbusier's concrete appeared in three books produced in quick succession, *Open Letter to Salvador Dalí* dated 1968, *Conversations with Dalí* from 1969, and *Dalí by Dalí* from 1970. In *Conversations with Dalí*, a series of interviews with Alain Bosquet, Dalí said, 'Le Corbusier was a pitiable creature working in reinforced concrete [...] [His] heaviness and the heaviness of the concrete deserve one another'.⁶² Such sinister outbursts are without equal in Dalí's oeuvre. Through the 1950s and 60s, each of Dalí's exhibitions, books, and public appearances received wide media coverage in America and Europe. *Open Letter to Salvador Dalí* and *Conversations with Dalí* were met with silence. A single British Art journal printed a joint review of the books' French editions without mentioning Le Corbusier.⁶³ It is possible that what appears to readers as sadistic fantasy and caustic gloating was a comedic strain that time and distance have stripped of its endearing poignancy. Dalí often referred to himself as a comedian,⁶⁴ consciously separating his public comic persona from his private self.⁶⁵ Regardless, then and now, the humour is difficult to appreciate. The string of theoretical associations Dalí was making here is indeed obscure. My interpretation of these outbursts is that Le Corbusier's death brought the prospect of his own death foremost to Dalí's mind, and he was concerned thereby with his own legacy and the prospect of artistic immortality, which Dalí associated with white shells, transparency and weightlessness.⁶⁶ In full reaction against the frightening heaviness of concrete, Dalí contrasted Buckminster Fuller's enormous Cloud Nine project (1960), geodesic spheres nearly a mile in diameter, which float in the atmosphere:

Le Corbusier had drowned by the weight of the reinforced concrete [...] Bags of reinforced concrete which, henceforth may never be carried up on to the moon [...] the only ones to reach her will be those ultralight dentitional structures, soon to be antigravitational, made by Fuller, the ones that can be wafted there by the slightest of human breaths.⁶⁷

In the years immediately after Le Corbusier died, while he was writing all these remarks, Dalí was planning his own museum and looking seriously at the significance of architectural form. From the beginning of the project the central room of the museum was to be roofed by a geodesic dome. Dalí asked Fuller to design it, who prevaricated, the project then was given to Emilio Pérez Piñero, about whom Fuller remarked approvingly, 'you have Piñero who does things that I do not know how he does them'.⁶⁸ Piñero died tragically in 1972 while driving the treacherous mountain road between Dalí's seaside home and the museum, and Dalí responded by writing an obscure new book, *Ten Recipes for Immortality* (1973).⁶⁹

When preparing *Delirious New York*, Koolhaas knew of Dalí's disdain for Le Corbusier's concrete, Dalí's growing focus on immortality, and the tragic death of Piñero. Although Koolhaas did not mention Dalí's vitriol in *Delirious New York*, he had read the sources. Koolhaas cited *Conversations with Dalí* in *Delirious New York*, and *Open Letter to Salvador Dalí* in his talk at the Architecture Association.⁷⁰ Koolhaas' silence over Dalí's hatred for Le Corbusier's concrete architecture is notable, considering Koolhaas' analogy of concrete as the perfect embodiment of the paranoid critical method. A partial explanation for Koolhaas' choice of concrete can be found in a quick, almost joking aside that Koolhaas made in the same talk at the Architecture Association about Dalí's most memorable architectural painting from the 1930s, *Millet's Architectonic 'Angelus'*.

Jean-Francois Millet's painting *The Angelus* (1859) was a subject of long fascination for Dalí. He painted dozens of variations and wrote a book-length interpretation.⁷¹ Dalí interpreted Millet's painting of a twilight farming couple praying in the fields as an archetypal image of sexual sado-masochism. Koolhaas had a long interest in Dalí's interpretation of this painting. Koolhaas used Dalí's variations of *The Angelus* in 'Exodus' (1972), his final diploma project at the Architectural Association, designed with Elia Zenghelis, Madelon Vriesendorp and Zoe Zenghelis, and later published at the beginning of *S, M, L, XL*.⁷² In both *Delirious New York* and in *S, M, L, XL*, Koolhaas quoted Dalí's autobiographical comment of encountering the skyscrapers of New York as giant figures from Millet's *Angelus*:

Desire: Each evening the skyscrapers of New York assume anthropomorphic shapes of multiple gigantic Millet's Angeluses [...] motionless, and ready to perform the sexual act and devour one another.⁷³

Dalí's most compelling variation of Millet's *Angelus* is arguably his 1933 painting, *Millet's Architectonic 'Angelus'*, in which the two figures are presented as simplified, almost abstract forms, as giant white sculptures. The scene is largely realistic, but the material these sculptures are made from is not in any way obvious. It appears to be perhaps an impossible object, built from an unspecified material we might call 'painter's plastic'. Madelon Vriesendorp drew her own variation of *Millet's Architectonic 'Angelus'* as one of the nineteen towers in OMA's speculative urban design project *City of the Captive Globe*, included in the appendix of *Delirious New York*.⁷⁴

In *Millet's Architectonic 'Angelus'*, the female figure holds a spike at the male figure's throat, producing an arrangement where a male sexual advance would guarantee death. This places the pair into a sado-masochistic arrangement of a sadistic woman and a masochistic male. Indeed, this is exactly the adjective Dalí used about Le Corbusier: masochistic.⁷⁵ Although this word may be pejorative, Dalí was not critical on the grounds of masochism. In his 1942 autobiography Dalí explained masochism as a valuable strategy in art: 'everyone underestimated the unconscious masochistic buyer who was avidly looking for the object capable of making him suffer in the most indefinite and least obvious way';⁷⁶ in the 1970s, Dalí proudly announced that he was 'every day more and more masochistic'.⁷⁷ *Millet's Architectonic 'Angelus'* presents an emotionally tense moment, expressed in pure concrete, and in this aspect took aim at a very similar architectural ambition as Le Corbusier. In his talk at the Architectural Association, Koolhaas offered an interpretation that *Millet's Architectonic 'Angelus'* may be a phantom portrait of Le Corbusier. Accordingly, it would benefit, Koolhaas intimates, from an alternate title, conciliatory and provocative, *The Apotheosis of Le Corbusier*.⁷⁸

Surrealist architecture before *Delirious New York*

Returning to the core of the definition of the paranoiac-critical method, to these 'objectifications of delirious associations', it is the delirium doing the surrealist work, and its techniques of objectification appear to be methodologically free.⁷⁹ Breton inferred this when writing in 1936 that the method 'has immediately shown itself capable of being applied with equal success to painting, poetry, the cinema, to the construction of typical surrealist objects, to fashions, to sculpture and even if necessary, to all manner of exegesis'.⁸⁰ How can one explain architecture's absence from this list? I suggest that it belongs in both 'surrealist objects' and the last bundling of 'all manner of exegesis', but Breton had not imagined architecture would possess the expressive freedom and technical virtuosity it would possess a century later. Producing surreal objects through obsessive accumulation had already been accepted by Breton in architectural form of Ferdinand Cheval's *Palais Idéal* (1879–1924), where decades of accumulated bricks and stones were piled into complex groves of columns, sculptures, and enclosures, and Kurt Schwitters' *Merzbau* (1927–1943) where accumulations of fragmentary timber and metal panels formed complex interiors.⁸¹ Such work looks to us more normal than they would have then, when Le Corbusier's early houses were the most innovative contemporary turn.

Dalí's general strategy for surpassing the constraints of automatism was anti-constructionalism. Nonetheless, his first major proposition for surrealist architecture referred to neither its method of production nor its relation to paranoia, but instead, Freudian psychodynamics. In 'On the Terrifying and Edible Beauty of Art Nouveau Architecture', Dalí claimed that Art Nouveau's ornamental and decorative details — precisely the details stripped from Le Corbusier's modern houses — served for the accommodation of repressed desires, for the

“functioning of desires” — desires, moreover, that are the most shady, discredited and shameful.⁸² Le Corbusier, Dalí claimed, was disgusted by Art Nouveau precisely because it provoked repressed ‘primal hunger’.⁸³ Modernism’s excoriation of ornamentation was an attempt to remove anything that provoked desire, and all of Le Corbusier’s rhetoric about admiring engineers’ machines, and critiques of the backwardness of architects, served to intellectualise and rationalise fear of these repressed desires.

Given Dalí’s critique of architectural modernism and theorisation of an anti-constructionalist method for painting, it is disappointing that there is little architectural work to illustrate these ideas. Dalí’s own architectural projects are almost all interior design projects and renovations, joining and collaging existing objects together. The Dream of Venus pavilion (1939) for the ‘New York World’s Fair’, which Koolhaas briefly discusses, too is mostly a sculptural collage, but its value in Dalí’s oeuvre is contestable since it is one of very few projects Dalí repudiated upon completion. The only wholly new freestanding architectural project that Dalí designed, and was content with the realisation, is the little known Crisalida pavilion (1958).⁸⁴ Designed for the American Medical Association’s annual convention, the small pavilion belongs to Dalí’s late work concentrating on integration rather than celebrating masochistic phantoms, and was explicitly aimed to spatialise the therapeutic effect of alleviating anxiety.⁸⁵ The pavilion was constructed from ‘thirteen wooden ribs criss-crossed with steel lattice’ with one hundred and sixteen coloured lights attached to the structure.⁸⁶ This frame was wrapped, inside and out, with translucent white parachute silk leaving a wide cavity between the skins.⁸⁷ Equipped with twenty-four air blowers to inflate the cavity, the building breathed, inhaling for five seconds and exhaling for fifteen. However, although this extraordinary temporary building might have provided an exceptional example of surreal architecture, it is too little known to have had any impact. Being relatively unknown, it is unlikely that Koolhaas knew of it while preparing *Delirious New York*. In the 1970s, the known aspects of architectural surrealism were constructionist assemblies of fragments obsessively piled into masses or collaged together, and innumerable beguiling details without a rational, cohering agenda.

By the 1970s, Dalí’s application of the paranoid-critical method had changed. The work of the 1930s was focussed on themes of parental and sexual anxiety, developing the lexicon of Freud, and philosophical issues of concealment under the influence of Heraclitus. Here the paranoid-critical method opened up a personal lexicon of trauma that was somewhat resolved. Dalí described himself in the years as suffering from a ‘psychical depression’.⁸⁸ By the 1940s, the depression appears to have resolved, the masochistic phantoms disappeared, and Dalí increasingly described himself as happy, and his interest in Freud waned. The change can be marked by the painting used on the cover of his autobiography, *Soft Self Portrait with Grilled Bacon* (1941), which depicts not the depths of the person but the thin surface as the fluid mask that conceals. From here Dalí’s character was calved into two distinct portions, and one part became the Dalí known to the world as a fictional character,

a comedian and entertainer. The interest in concealment that was philosophical in the 1930s became, by the late 1940s, less philosophical and more practical and theatrical. 'I always behave like an actor [...] it is a methodological vice'.⁸⁹ While Breton's claim that Dalí was both actor and spectator in paranoia was debatable in the 1930s, it was certainly true by the 1970s. In these latter decades, with Freudian associations behind him, Dalí's work was concerned with physics and immortality, blending seemingly scattershot branches of association based on sketchy ideas and inaccurate facts. As Elliott King has written of Dalí's late method, Dalí would often 'wholly misunderstand a scientific concept and then, even upon realising it, deliberately build upon his "error"'.⁹⁰ This is the evolved version of the paranoid-critical method that Dalí was actively using when Koolhaas was writing *Delirious New York*, not oriented to the discovery of Freudian phantoms but pointing in many directions, including directly at architecture.

Dalí in *Delirious New York*

By the mid-1970s, when Koolhaas was writing *Delirious New York*, Surrealism was at an ebb, yet beginning to rise. Then, paranoia meant a few things. Paranoia had always been colloquially understood as persecution mania, but it held a more nuanced meaning for the surrealists. Constitutionalism was abandoned when paranoia was no longer understood as originating from physical degeneration, and instead, understood as a mode of reaction. Constructionalism was abandoned when it was understood that paranoid ideation occurs unconsciously and effects fundamental phenomena including vision. Ultimately, paranoid association is understood as a psychological mechanism running consciously and unconsciously. The dualism that opens up at the extreme ends of the conscious-unconscious spectra explains the capacity for people to have multiple motivations, some conscious and others unconscious. A recurring theme in surrealist art is the unconscious, the awareness of an influential absence, presented through irony, veils, or shadows.

Conflicting intentions is a narrative motif of *Delirious New York*. Again and again Koolhaas points us to the tensions between declared and concealed intentions, to people being fundamentally unaware of themselves, and, by association, buildings that are unaware of themselves. This is evident in two adjacent concepts, the schism and the lobotomy. The schism is the social and functional disconnection between the stories of tall buildings. Occupants on one floor of a tall building are oblivious to what occurs on the floors above and below them; independent within the buildings, each storey is effectively unconscious of the others.⁹¹ Next is the lobotomy, the 'dissociation between inside and outside', which meant that the exterior of the building is its own entity, unconstrained by any obligation to represent the building's interior, its purpose, or its structure.⁹² Whatever large buildings visually say about their identities, they misrepresent themselves and conceal their interiors. Buildings with schisms and lobotomies are either unaware of themselves or concealing

themselves. By imagining that a tall building has a secret that it is hiding, the building becomes animated with our expectation, and becomes, whether by illusion or actuality, a little more alive. Like Dalí architecturalising the people in Millet's *Angelus*, Koolhaas arrives at the same object from the inverse theoretical direction: anthropomorphising architecture.

In the penultimate chapter of *Delirious New York*, when Koolhaas introduces surrealist Dalí and modernist architect Le Corbusier, a reader might by now expect some form of ironic reversal: a rational surrealist and a paranoid rationalist. Koolhaas first teases: 'Le Corbusier's persona and method of operation show many parallels with Dalí's'.⁹³ Then, reversing Le Corbusier's claim that Surrealism bears signs of illness and Purism bears signs of health, Koolhaas diagnoses Dalí as 'a sane and rational mind that has insinuated himself into the process of paranoia',⁹⁴ and identifies 'involuntary signs of a truly paranoiac streak in [Le Corbusier's] character',⁹⁵ and more sharply in his talk at the Architecture Association, 'Le Corbusier was a clinically paranoid person who tries to pretend that he is rational'.⁹⁶

What is meant by paranoid here? This is not persecution mania. Paranoid here means a systematised delirium of interpretation, coupled with the energy to draw the alternate reality towards existence. A paranoiac, in short, is someone passionately, systematically delusional. Having prepared his reader to conceptualise buildings with human psychological characteristics, Koolhaas gives his own definition:

[The paranoid critical method is] a sequence of two consecutive but discrete operations:

1. the synthetic reproduction of the paranoiac's way of seeing the world in a new light — with its rich harvest of unsuspected correspondences, analogies, and patterns; and
2. the compression of these gaseous speculations to a critical point where they achieve the density of fact: the critical part of the method consists of the fabrication of objectifying 'souvenirs' of the paranoid tourism, of concrete evidence that brings the 'discoveries' of these excursions back to the rest of mankind, ideally in forms as obvious and undeniable as snapshots.⁹⁷

While Koolhaas' description is largely consistent with Dalí's, it goes further. In his first point, Koolhaas aptly conveys the extent to which paranoia permeates the personality to the level of elementary phenomena. Whether or not the method requires, as Koolhaas has it, a 'synthetic reproduction' of a paranoiac's way of seeing, rather than an actual instance of a paranoiac's sight, brings up the fraught relationship between artistic authenticity and post-modern irony, which the reader can explore in Roger Rothman's essay 'Dalí's inauthenticity'.⁹⁸

The second part of Koolhaas' definition begins with a clear articulation of process. Though the paranoiac-critical method is a method of producing (irrational) knowledge, it is only evident as *objectified knowledge*. Koolhaas explains that the delirious speculations reach 'the density of fact', which in Dalí's language I would reframe as delirious speculations resembling the simulacra. Dalí's recognition of a resemblance to the simulacra points to a surrealist quality outside Koolhaas' brief rendering in *Delirious New York* — the intersection of the psychological with the ontographic and the mythic, like the

intersection of time and memory in *The Persistence of Memory*, are core thematic values in Dalí's art.

Proceeding from the position that paranoid artists make surrealist art because of how they see, not because of a particular set of techniques, and being well aware of Dalí's disdain for concrete architecture — though not mentioning it in *Delirious New York* — Koolhaas uses concrete construction, 'Le Corbusier's favourite method of objectification', as the exemplar of paranoid critical activity:

[T]he phantom conjectural structure or so-called shuttering is erected — the initial delusion [...] [and afterwards, the concrete has] a horribly undeniable reality even after the signs of madness — the shuttering — have been removed.⁹⁹

It is, to my understanding, an admirably accurate analogy. Having dispelled the last remaining barrier to a surrealist architecture made of concrete, namely Dalí's vociferous objections, and having already described the architecture of New York as 'the pursuit of irrational ends by entirely rational means',¹⁰⁰ Koolhaas could then assert what is arguably the core of the manifesto, that '[a]rchitecture is *inevitably* a form of PC [paranoid critical] activity'.¹⁰¹

Looking at Koolhaas 'apparently radical statement that architecture is inevitably the result of paranoid critical activity', it is not, as it first appears, a statement of the surreality of architecture, but a remark about the generality and broad applicability of the method. It also reminds us that the method alone is not enough to validate surrealist activity. Irony, unconsciousness, concealment, a more or less subtly sinister affect emerging from the suggestion of ulterior motives, and a dreamy otherness — often embodied by unusually strong juxtapositions — are Surrealism's recognisable motifs. A loose coalition of qualities allows new surrealisms in art and architecture to emerge with endless variation.

Breton's preference for constructionalist paranoia allowed for the paranoid to assemble objects automatically and encounter ready-mades on their derives, but the laborious premeditated project of oil painting or architecture did not seem within reach of the revelatory, improvisational, mediumistic operations of Breton's ideas of surreal activity. This limited the scope too much for architecture, but was the necessary foundation for later creative freedoms to take flight. The revolutionary politics, ethos, and mythos that distinguished Breton's Parisian surrealist group were washed out at the level of generality in Dalí's method, but then recaptured by Koolhaas, kicking open the door to the living tradition of Surrealism, and *endlessly* framing and reframing Surrealism's Dionysian revelations. Dalí, Lacan, and Koolhaas preferred the anti-constructionalist interpretation of paranoia because it explained both the intimated existence of a paranoid associative engine and why paranoids would encounter unusual things. The compromise is that a self-declared paranoid could infer that *anything* they did would be surreal; hence, when responding to criticism that his new work was not surreal, Dalí would reply 'I am [S]urrealism'.¹⁰² The cost of accepting paranoia as a personality structure was that it dissolved the boundaries separating Surrealism from anything that any self-declared surrealist might call it, or might declare that it is not.

The austere minimalism that Le Corbusier advocated in the 1920s and 30s was aesthetically antithetical to the surrealist's preference for lush, ornamented décor, notwithstanding that Le Corbusier himself was known for increasingly surreal behaviour, not least breaking into Eileen Grey's house and painting abstract people on the walls.¹⁰³ The surrealists rejoiced in the revelation of the unconscious, which for Le Corbusier was private. Yet as Dalí demonstrated with Art Nouveau, non-surreal architecture can be made surreal through exegesis. And this is no doubt something Koolhaas contributed to with his story about a paranoid Le Corbusier. The heaviness of the 1950s and 60s Brutalism that Dalí objected to is very different to the soaring concrete ribs of Santiago Calatrava's Lyon airport terminal or soft folds of Zaha Hadid's Baku Heydar Aliyev cultural centre. It seems unlikely Dalí would throw the same critiques at these examples of modern concrete architecture.

Drawing concrete into the orbit of surrealist architecture, Koolhaas gives readers 'a tourism of sanity into the realm of paranoia'.¹⁰⁴ Koolhaas' paranoid criticism and Dalí's paranoiac-critical method are subtly different theories, though in many ways the hybrid of constructionalist and anti-constructionalist methods, and an evolutionary step for Surrealism to grow out from under the wings of the twentieth-century preferences, into a more expansive and adaptable mode of creative production, ready to speculate about our paranoiacally surreal future.

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1. Anthony Vidler, 'Architecture After the Rain', *Architectural Design*, 88.2 (2018), 16–23 (p. 18).
2. Rem Koolhaas, *Delirious New York* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 246.
3. At the beginning of 1975, Haim Finkelstein, who twenty years later would translate most of Dalí's theoretical essays into English, published his first essay on Surrealism, 'Dalí's Paranoia-Criticism or The Exercise of Freedom'. Whether or not Koolhaas knew of Finkelstein's essay while writing *Delirious New York* is unknown, as nothing suggests he did.
4. The endnotes of *Delirious New York* contain seven Dalí references. Koolhaas extracted a line each from the first and second page of Dalí's book, *The Visible Woman* (1930). Koolhaas used the definition of the paranoiac-critical method from the essay 'The Conquest of the Irrational' (1935) as reproduced in the Dalí and Alain Bosquet's *Conversations with Dalí* (1969), which included anecdotes about Dalí's arrival in New York from his first autobiography, *The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí* (1942); an obscure 1941 newspaper article 'New York Salutes Me!'; the example of the ascension with peas from his second auto-

biography, *Diary of a Genius* (1964/1971); and only as a source of further information about Dalí's obsession with the *Angelus* does Koolhaas refer to Dalí's 'The Tragic Myth of Millet's *Angelus*'. The 1978 AD issue on 'Surrealism and Architecture' includes a translation of the essay, 'Art Nouveau Architecture's Terrifying and Edible Beauty' (1934), and Dalí's preface, 'The Vision of Gaudí' (1969), to Robert Descharnes' Gaudí monograph. The three papers that extend this list are: first, Frances Hsu, 'The Revolutionary (Re)Vision of Modern Architecture: Rem Koolhaas, from Surrealism to the Structuralist Activity', 91st ACSA International Conference (2003), 23–34, which addresses Dalí's essay: 'My Paintings in the Autumn Salon'; second, again Frances Hsu, 'Delirious New York: The Revolutionary Revision of Modern Architecture', 93rd ACSA Annual Meeting Proceedings, *The Art of Architecture/The Science of Architecture* (2005), 15–22, which addresses two more Dalí essays: 'The Moral Position of Surrealism', and 'My Paintings in the Autumn Salon'; and third, Simon Weir, "'To Look is to Invent": Speculations on the Influence of Salvador Dalí in the Work of Rem Koolhaas', 24th International Conference of the Society of Architectural Historians, Australia and New Zealand (2007), 9–23, which addresses Salvador Dalí and Louis Pauwels, *The Passions According to Dalí* (St. Petersburg, FL: The Salvador Dalí Foundation, 1968).

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13. Lepoutre, Madeira, and Guerin, 'The Lacanian Concept of Paranoia', p. 3.
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16. Sigmund Freud, *Leonardo da Vinci: A Psychosexual Study of an Infantile Reminiscence* (New York, NY: Moffat, Yard and Co., 1916), p. 82.
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24. Salvador Dalí, 'Poema de les cosetes' ['Poem of the Small Things'], *L'Amic de les Arts*, Stiges, year 3, no. 27, 31 August 1928, p. 211; Salvador Dalí, 'Con el sol [With the Sun]', *La Gaceta Literaria*, Madrid, no. 54, 15 March 1929, p. 1.
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27. Salvador Dalí, *La Femme Visible* (Paris: Éditions surréalistes, 1930), p. 12.
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37. Dalí, *La Femme Visible*, p. 6.
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 58. Le Corbusier, *When the Cathedrals were White* (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 147.
 59. See Salvador Dalí, Lluís Montanya, and Sebastia Gasch, *Manifest Groc* (Barcelona: Fills de F. Sabater, 1928); Salvador Dalí, 'Nous limits de la pintura', *L'Amic de les Arts*, Stiges, year 3, no. 24 (30 April 1928), p. 185; and Fèlix Fanés, *Salvador Dalí: The Construction of the Image 1925–1930* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 90–1.
 60. Salvador Dalí, *Dalí on Modern Art* (New York, NY: Dover, 1957), pp. 29–31.
 61. Le Corbusier and I. Žaknić, *The Final Testament of Père Corbu: A Translation and Interpretation of Mise Au Point* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 67.
 62. Salvador Dalí and Alain Bosquet, *Conversations with Dalí* (New York, NY: E.P. Dutton & Co, 1969), p. 9; Dalí adds: 'Le Corbusier simply went down for the third time, because

- of his reinforced concrete and his architectures, the ugliest and most unacceptable buildings in the world'. Ibid., p. 17.
63. Otto Hahn, 'Avida Dollars', *Art and Artist*, London, 31 October 1966, pp. 32–3.
 64. See Alice Hughes, 'A Woman's New York, [Salvador Dalí describes ...]', *Eagle*, Reading, Pennsylvania, 17 May 1959; Lauren Lyons, 'The Lyons Den, [Salvador Dalí walked ...]', *Post*, New York, 8 April 1959; both in Gala-Salvador Dalí Foundation collection, Centre for Dalinian Studies; also see Salvador Dalí interviewed by Mike Wallace.
 65. [Anon.], 'Dalí, Gala and Moolah', *Newsweek*, New York, NY, 27 December 1965, also from Gala-Salvador Dalí Foundation collection, Centre for Dalinian Studies; also see Dalí and Bosquet, *Conversations*, p. 15.
 66. Dalí began discussing his desire for immortality just months after Le Corbusier's death, for example: S. Dalí, 'Who is Surrealism?', *Vogue*, New York, 15 April 1968, pp. 83, 139.
 67. Salvador Dalí, *Open Letter to Salvador Dalí* (New York, NY: Heineman, 1968), p. 72.
 68. Salvador Dalí, 'The Work of Pérez Piñero', *Architecture*, 163/164 (1972) (p. 7). A similar reference can be found in Dalí, *Dalí Dalí*, p. 65.
 69. S. Dalí, *Ten Recipes for Immortality* (Pari: Audouin-Descharnes, 1973); Elliot King, 'Ten Recipes for Immortality: A Study in Dalinian Science and Paranoiac Fictions', in *Surrealism, Science Fiction and Comics*, ed. by Gavin Parkinson (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2015), pp. 213–32.
 70. See Koolhaas, *Delirious New York*, p. 235; and R. Koolhaas, 'Rem Koolhaas – Salvador Dalí, The Paranoid Critical Method, Le Corbusier, New York', public lecture at the Architectural Association School of Architecture, 18 December 1976 <<https://youtu.be/HcnRzxQu27w>> [accessed 22 July 2022]. In his AA talk, Koolhaas showed a slide of the table grading artists work from the *Open Letter*. The *Dalí by Dalí* version is quoted in *S, M, L, XL*. See also Dalí, *Dalí Dalí*, p.41; Koolhaas and Mau, *S, M, L, XL*, p.1114; and in extended form in Dalí, *Open Letter*, pp. 93–6.
 71. Salvador Dalí, *Le Mythe tragique de l'Angéus de Millet : interprétation 'paranoïaque-critique'* (Paris: Jean-Jacques Pauvert, 1963).
 72. Koolhaas and Mau, *S, M, L, XL*, pp. 3–21.
 73. Koolhaas, *Delirious New York*, p. 265; Koolhaas and Mau, *S, M, L, XL*, pp. 288, 1287. Koolhaas cites from Salvador Dalí, 'New York Salutes Me!', *Spain*, 23 May 1941.
 74. Vriesendorp said the other soft buildings illustrating *Delirious New York*, clearly reminiscent of Dalí, were not made for Koolhaas' book, but for her own project and included only during the publishing stage. Koolhaas explained that when the first image, *Après l'Amour*, was painted, the text had not yet been written. The text and imagery were 'parallel narrative[s]', both critically formalising the paranoiac framework developed in conversation. See *The World of Madelon Vriesendorp: Paintings, Postcards, Objects, Games*, ed. by Shumon Basar and Stephan Trüby (London: AA Publications, 2008), pp. 42, 264.
 75. Dalí, *Dalí on Modern Art*, pp.29–31.
 76. Dalí, *Secret Life*, pp. 290–1.
 77. *Aquarius: Hello Dalí*, dir. by Bruce Gowers (LWT, 1973) <https://youtu.be/uoYBg_0EbxA> [accessed 22 July 2022].
 78. Koolhaas, public lecture at the AA, 18 December 1976.
 79. Dalí, *The Conquest of the Irrational*, p. 15; Koolhaas, *Delirious New York*, p. 237; Koolhaas and Mau, *S, M, L, XL*, p. 1012.
 80. Breton, *What is Surrealism?*, p. 82.
 81. Neil Spiller, *Architecture and Surrealism* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2016), pp. 11, 24.
 82. Salvador Dalí, 'De la beauté terrifiante at comestible de l'architecture modern style', *Minotaure*, 3/4 (1933), 69–77 (p. 72).

83. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
84. Simon Weir, 'Surrealist Architecture: Dalí's 1958 *Crisalida*, San Francisco', *Journal of Surrealism in the Americas*, 13.1, (2022), 98–117.
85. Montse Aguer Teixidor and others, *Dalí – Mass Culture* (Barcelona: Fundació 'la Caixa', 2004), pp. 18, 30.
86. Allen Shoenfield, 'Dalí and Tranquillizers', *News*, Detroit, Michigan, 7 July 1958, in Gala-Salvador Dalí Foundation collection, Centre for Dalinian Studies.
87. 'To Nirvana with Miltown', *Time*, New York, 7 July 1958, p. 60; 'Pass the miltown, Salvador', *Architectural Forum*, (New York), 31 August 1958, in Gala-Salvador Dalí Foundation collection, Centre for Dalinian Studies.
88. Meredith Etherington-Smith, *The Persistence of Memory* (London: Random House, 1992), pp. 173–4; also quoting R. Santos Torroella, *Salvador Dalí, Corresponsal de J. V. Foix, 1932–1936* (Barcelona: Editorial Mediterrania, 1986), p. 137.
89. Manuel Del Arco, *Dalí in the Nude* (St. Petersburg, FL: Salvador Dalí Museum, 1984), pp. 85–8 (first publ. in 1954).
90. King, 'Ten Recipes for Immortality', p. 218.
91. Koolhaas, *Delirious New York*, p. 115.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
94. Koolhaas, public lecture at the AA, 18 December 1976. Here Koolhaas reiterates Dalí's famous claim that 'the sole difference between myself and a mad man is the fact that I am not mad!'; see Dalí, *Secret Life*, p. 371.
95. Koolhaas, *Delirious New York*, p. 246.
96. Koolhaas, public lecture at the AA, 18 December 1976.
97. Koolhaas, *Delirious New York*, p. 238.
98. Roger Rothman, 'Dalí's Inauthenticity', *Modernism/Modernity*, 14.3, (2007), 489–97.
99. Koolhaas, public lecture at the AA, 18 December 1976; Koolhaas, *Delirious New York*, p. 248.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
102. Salvador Dalí and Louis Pauwels, *The Passions According to Dalí* (St. Petersburg, FL: Salvador Dalí Foundation, 1968), p. 156.
103. Beatriz Colomina, 'Battle lines: E.1027', *Renaissance and Modern Studies*, 39.1 (1996), 95–105.
104. Koolhaas, *Delirious New York*, p. 237.